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Abstract
Why might a democratically elected government choose to run a sustained fiscal deficit in the
face of many potential drawbacks? In this paper, I contribute in two important ways to our
understanding of the political causes of fiscal outcomes. First, I develop a theoretical argument
that democracies with a few large districts will have greater political incentives to provide
balanced budgets than democracies with many small districts. Second, I test my theory (and,
preliminarily, other theories) with a much broader empirical model than those generally used in
the literature. The project helps bring to light the multidimensional impact of electoral
proportionality on deficit spending, a theoretical development that has the potential to improve
greatly our understanding of policy formation in a variety of areas. It also helps pull developing
countries and diverse democratic institutions into a literature that has centered on explaining
behavior in wealthy, parliamentary systems.
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There are few better ways to understand the behavior of states than to examine how they
spend money. Control over fiscal policy is clearly among the most important powers that
governments, however constituted, enjoy. In this paper, I focus my attention on the institutional
determinants of budget deficits in democracies, a key aspect of fiscal policy-making.
Budget deficits are generated when governments spend more money than they take in
from taxes and other sources of revenue. While short-term budget deficits can be a prudent
response to temporary fiscal shocks, most economists agree that sustained deficits can damage a
country’s economy. Among the potential harms associated with sustained budget deficits are
contracted national savings, reduced future incomes (Gale and Orszag 2003), and long-term
current account deficits (Yellen 1989). Further, in less stable developing economies, long-term
deficits can lead to capital flight in anticipation of possible future government default or
monetary expansion. As a result, while individual recipients of government largess may benefit
from sustained deficit spending, the aggregate, long-term national impact is likely to be negative.
Why might a democratically elected government choose to run a sustained fiscal deficit
in the face of these potential drawbacks? A large literature explores the role of domestic political
and fiscal institutions in influencing a government’s spending decisions. The primary insight of
this literature is that a government’s budget can be thought of as a common pooled resource (e.g.
Hallerberg 2004, Roubini and Sachs 1988). As a result, political institutions that centralize
responsibility over the budget will tend to discourage fiscal deficits, whereas institutions that
diffuse responsibility will tend to encourage them. Building from this insight, among others,
scholars have sought to link deficit spending to a variety of institutional characteristics, including
government fragmentation, fiscal decentralization, and rapid government turnover.

2

I seek to contribute to this literature in two ways. First, I introduce the role of electoral
district size and present a novel theory to clarify the impact of electoral system characteristics on
deficit spending. Scholars have debated the precise impact of relative electoral system
proportionality on the formation of a variety of public policies.1 Consequently, ironing out the
role of electoral rules in one area of public policy – budgetary politics – can contribute more
broadly to our understanding of governmental decision-making in democracies. I propose to do
that here.
In the literature on deficit spending, research has examined the potential role of electoral
system largely through its impact on government turnover and party fragmentation in governing
coalitions and legislatures. Many political economists have found that, as the number of parties
in a democracy’s governing coalition or legislature increases, its propensity to engage in deficit
spending also increases (e.g. Roubini and Sachs 1988, Roubini and Sachs 1989, Volkerink and
de Haan 2001, Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999, Kontopoulos and Perotti 1999). A related
finding of the literature is that more government turnover tends to produce higher public deficits
(Roubini and Sachs 1988, Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini 1991, Franzese 2002). Because
party fragmentation and government turnover are associated with proportional electoral rules
(e.g. Duverger 1954, Lijphart 1999), scholars have gone on to conclude that proportional
representation (PR) tends to give rise to budget deficits (e.g. Roubini and Sachs 1988, Grilli,
Masciandaro, and Tabellini 1991, Alesina and Perotti 1999, Persson and Tabellini 2003).
In this article, I do not dispute that electoral system proportionality, through its
association with party fragmentation or government turnover, may lead to deficits. Rather, I
highlight that PR systems are also associated with another important institutional characteristic –
electoral district size and number. Countries with more proportional electoral rules will also tend
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to have larger and fewer electoral districts. I build a theory, roughly similar to that proposed for
trade policy by Rogowski (1987), relating electoral district characteristics to government
spending outcomes. I argue that democracies with a few large districts will have greater political
incentives to provide the public good of balanced budgets than democracies with many small
districts. Consequently, I suggest in this article that proportional systems may tend towards
deficits by their effects on party fragmentation, but away from deficits by their impact on
electoral district size.
It may appear at first glance that this argument is logically contradictory, but it is not.
The association between electoral rules, party fragmentation, and electoral district size is an
imperfect one, contingent on a variety of other factors. As a result, PR produces relatively small
districts and relatively high party fragmentation in some countries, and the opposite in others.
This country-dependent impact of electoral proportionality may have given rise to the ambiguous
findings of many previous studies relating electoral rules to public policy outcomes.2 Therefore,
I argue here that, if we seek to understand the influence of electoral system characteristics on
governmental decision-making, we must examine party fragmentation and electoral district size
separately.
My second contribution in this paper is to provide one of the most comprehensive
empirical tests yet undertaken of the cross-national relationship between political institutions and
budget deficits. Previous scholars have tested their contentions primarily with data from the
OECD countries and, to a lesser extent, Latin America. Further, many of these tests have not
drawn observations from a very wide swath of years. In this paper, I look at all democracies
from 1975 to 2000. With allowances for the significant holes in data availability, I include in my
dataset 853 observations coming from 66 different countries for an average of 13 years each.3

4

Such a comprehensive dataset is especially useful because it allows an evaluation of the theory’s
relevance for both rich and poor democracies. I use this broad empirical model to test my
theoretical propositions and to provide some initial evidence for the generalizability of other
arguments prevalent in the literature.
In the next section, I provide a summary of what we already know about the relationship
between domestic institutions and budgetary outcomes. I then develop my own theory that
relates electoral district size and number to budget deficits, placing it within the context of the
prior literature. In the fourth section, I discuss my data and methods for the empirical test, and,
in the fifth section, I present and discuss the results. In the paper’s final section, I draw some
conclusions and implications from the research.

The Literature: Political Institutions and Deficit Spending

Scholars have sought explanations for deficit spending in government fragmentation,
fiscal process fragmentation, or government turnover. Theories relating the first two of these
institutional characteristics to deficits generally rely on similar logical foundations. Typically,
they begin by recognizing that government budgets are common pooled resources and balanced
budgets a public good (eg. Roubini and Sachs 1988, Roubini and Sachs 1989, Volkerink and de
Haan 2001, Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999, Hallerberg 2004).4 Sustained balanced budgets can
have a variety of beneficial effects on a country’s aggregate economic welfare. Most
importantly, they can help sustain a high level of savings, contribute to a future growth in
national income, and maintain balance in the current account (Gale and Orszag 2003, Yellen
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1989). Developing countries that practice fiscal responsibility are also less likely to suffer from
capital flight than their more profligate counterparts.
As governments seek to capture these benefits by balancing their budgets, however, they
often run headlong into a collective action problem. In countries with a decentralized policy
environment, a number of influential individuals (whether cabinet ministers, legislators, or other
actors) have significant influence over the budget. In such systems, each influential official has
an incentive to direct as much spending as possible to her constituents, but no single individual
has final authority over the total amount spent. A prisoner’s dilemma game ensues, with no
player wanting a budget deficit but each unwilling to relinquish unilaterally the piece of the
fiscal pie that he has won.
Conversely, when budget-making is centralized, overcoming the collective action
problem and providing a balanced budget is significantly easier. In this situation, final authority
over the budget is in the hands of one individual (or at least a small number of individuals). This
individual is presumably responsive to the national interest in maintaining a balanced budget and
is also empowered to put an end to any fiscal free riding.
Using this logic, political scientists and economists have argued that budget deficits are
more likely in countries with fragmented or decentralized governments. This fragmentation may
take a number of forms. For example, many scholars have identified a relationship between
governing coalition size and budget deficits (Roubini and Sachs 1988, Roubini and Sachs 1989,
Volkerink and de Haan 2001, Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999, Kontopoulos and Perotti 1999).
The argument here is simple; the more political parties are represented in a governing coalition,
the more participants there will be in the budget process. If several parties are needed to
maintain a government’s parliamentary majority, it will be difficult even for a prime minister to
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reign in spending. As a result, the collective action problem highlighted above will not be
overcome.5
Examining a related form of government fragmentation, Volkerink and de Haan (2001)
identify a relationship between the number of parties in a country’s legislature and the
probability that the country will run a budget deficit. Likewise, Edin and Ohlsson (1991) find
that minority parliamentary governments are more likely to engage in deficit spending, while
Volkerink and de Haan (2001) extend that argument to governments with very small majorities.
Franzese (2002) argues that presidential democracies are less prone to deficit spending than
parliamentary democracies because they empower an executive with a national constituency.
These findings indicate that weak governments, greater party system fragmentation, and
parliamentarianism may lead to a decentralized budget process and a reduced chance of
overcoming the fiscal collective action problem.
In a similar vein, Hallerberg and Marier (2004) show that, in Latin American presidential
systems, a strong executive is necessary to tame legislative spending when party and electoral
rules provide an “incentive to cultivate a personal vote”.6 In other words, when factors such as
candidate selection encourage party decentralization, higher budget deficits will tend to result
unless a strong executive is present to provide centralized leadership. Nielson (2003) and
Hankla (Forthcoming), in a related finding from the trade literature, argue for a direct
relationship between party decentralization and protectionism.
Turning their attention from the broader institutions of government, other scholars have
focused on the more specific issue of fiscal process fragmentation. Taking as their starting point
the common pooled resource logic, these political economists have found evidence that budget
deficits are higher when there are more spending ministers in a country’s cabinet (Kontopoulos
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and Perotti 1999, Volkerink and de Haan 2001) and when finance ministers are weak (Hahm,
Kamlet, and Mowery 1996). Hallerberg (2004) seeks to integrate this research with the literature
on government fragmentation. In a series of essays, he argues that European countries with high
levels of party competition generally produce balanced budgets. Within this high competition
group, however, the precise strategy that a country uses to overcome deficit spending will vary
according to the nature of its party system.
Beyond government and fiscal process fragmentation, researchers have also considered
the potential role of rapid government turnover in generating budget deficits (Roubini and Sachs
1988, Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini 1991, Franzese 2002). They have argued that, when a
government’s expected tenure in office is short, political leaders have relatively short time
horizons. Consequently, they have an incentive to spend as much money on their constituents as
possible while leaving future governments holding the fiscal bag. In other words, when
government turnover is rapid, political leaders expect to be safely out of office when the
economic consequences of their deficit spending finally surface. The inverse is true of
politicians with longer expected tenures in office. These leaders know that they may still be in
office to be blamed if their spending policies do economic damage.

The Literature: Electoral System Characteristics and Public Policy

Political scientists and economists have examined the influence of electoral system
characteristics on a variety of policy outcomes, but some of the literature’s findings remain
ambiguous. For example, in his examination of trade, Rogowski (1987) argues that democracies
with large, proportional electoral districts generally have lower barriers than those with small,
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single-member districts. For him, large electoral districts tend to dilute the influence of
protectionist interests, which are often geographically concentrated. Likewise electoral system
proportionality, which Rogowski fully associates with large district size, tends to produce highly
disciplined parties with an incentive to provide the public good of free trade. By contrast,
Mansfield and Busch (1995) dispute the one-to-one relationship between proportional
representation and free trade, arguing that it is mediated by country size and macroeconomic
conditions. As a result, they argue that majoritarian institutions can, in some instances, produce
more liberal outcomes than proportional institutions.
For the most part, scholars of public finance have used electoral rules to explain the
composition and level of a government’s spending rather than its propensity to run a deficit. For
example, researchers have found that proportional electoral systems encourage more spending on
public goods than do majoritarian electoral systems, which tend to emphasize private goods
(Persson and Tabellini 2000, Lizzeri and Persico 2001, Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno
2002, Persson and Tabellini 2003). Persson and Tabellini (2000, 2003) also associate
proportional electoral systems with more overall spending, while Edwards and Thames (2005)
contend that countries with mixed electoral systems are likely to spend the most, as they must
provide both public and private goods.
In the budget deficit literature itself, researchers have tended to view electoral rules as
influencing government behavior primarily through their impact on party systems and governing
coalitions. As we have seen, the evidence indicates that party fragmentation, as well as rapid
government turnover, leads to a higher incidence of budget deficits. Further, scholars of political
institutions have long noted that party systems are more likely to be fragmented and government
tenure is likely to be shorter when legislators are elected under proportional rather than
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majoritarian rules (e.g. Duverger 1954, Lijphart 1999). Proportional electoral systems allow
parties to win legislative seats with a smaller percentage of the vote than do majoritarian
systems, often leading to more partisan diversity in governing coalitions and legislatures. The
ideological diversity that results frequently complicates the maintenance of government stability,
increasing the chances of rapid turnover.
These observations have led many scholars to argue that democracies using proportional
representation (PR) tend to have higher budget deficits and lower budget surpluses (e.g. Roubini
and Sachs 1988, Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini 1991, Alesina and Perotti 1999, Persson and
Tabellini 2003). An impressive cross-sectional analysis by Persson and Tabellini (2003)
provides empirical evidence for this position, although ambiguous results from the larger crosssectional, time-series component of their book call this finding somewhat into question.7

The Theory: Political Parties and Deficit Spending

I present in this section a more nuanced understanding of the impact of electoral system
characteristics on deficit spending, one that may help explain the ambiguous results mentioned
above. It is true that the literature identifies a clear link between party system fragmentation and
budget deficits. It is also true that decades of research, beginning with Maurice Duverger’s
classic 1954 treatise, have confirmed the association of electoral proportionality with party
system fragmentation. I do not dispute these findings. However, I contend that another
consequence of electoral system proportionality – its association with large electoral districts –
must not be ignored.
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Indeed, I argue here that democracies with a few large electoral districts (relative to
population) will tend to engage in less deficit spending than democracies with many small
districts. To put it differently, I contend that countries whose legislatures are elected from a
small number of large constituencies are better able to overcome the collective action problem
that impedes balanced budgets. When legislators in a democracy are elected from a few large
districts, they represent sizeable constituencies that are not likely to be dominated by a single
special interest. As a result, each elected representative will be forced to consider the interests of
a wide variety of groups when deciding a political course of action. By contrast, when
legislators are elected from many small districts, each of them will represent a small number of
special interests. The needs of these special interests will therefore be an important
consideration for the elected officials in their political decision-making.
As a result, when political leaders are elected from larger districts, they have a greater
incentive to consider economic policies that benefit the broader interest. One such economic
policy is fiscal responsibility; a balanced budget, as I have noted, can help improve national
saving and raise future national income. The larger an elected official’s district, the harder for
her to satisfy all relevant constituent groups with private financial transfers. Likewise, the larger
her district, the more the district’s joint interests approximate the national interest in a balanced
budget.
When legislators are elected from numerous small districts, on the other hand, they will
be tempted to build political support by transferring funds to the special interests that dominate
the constituency. These transfers will be likely to happen at the expense of achieving a balanced
budget. Furthermore, the presence of more elected representatives in a parliament or legislature
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will increase the number of potential participants in the budgetary process, exacerbating the freerider problem.
An analysis of the United States senate, where district size varies by state, can help
illustrate this concept. Bailey and Brady (1998) have shown that senators from heterogeneous
states are freer to pursue policies in keeping with their party ideologies than senators from
homogenous states, who must appease specific constituent interests in order to be reelected.
Larger districts are of course more likely to be heterogeneous, and their elected representatives
will likely be unable to provide particularistic benefits to all of their constituents. As a result,
while they might individually prefer balanced budgets, these politicians will have an incentive to
free-ride on the fiscal concessions of others, leading to deficits.
While Rogowski (1987) has presented a similar argument in his classic examination of
trade policy, I am aware of no previous study that has considered electoral district size or number
as a factor in deficit spending. Furthermore, Rogowski considers electoral system
proportionality and electoral district size to be directly related, and so does not evaluate whether
they might have different effects. Indeed, to my knowledge, no prior study has attempted to
parse out systematically the differing, and potentially contradictory, ways in which electoral
rules may influence policy-making.
My analysis suggests that PR can tend toward budget deficits through its impact on party
fragmentation, but can also tend towards budget surpluses through its link to large electoral
districts. To avoid mixed results, I believe that the two potential tendencies of electoral system
proportionality must be analyzed separately, both theoretically and empirically. Such an
approach is possible because the association between proportionality, party fragmentation, and
electoral district size is not perfect. While systems with a high effective number of parties also
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tend to have large electoral districts, there are also democracies with fragmented party systems
and many smaller districts (e.g. India) and democracies with relatively cohesive party systems
and a few larger districts (e.g. Colombia, Austria). Table 1 presents correlation coefficients
measuring the relationship among electoral system, the effective number of legislative parties,
and electoral district number. It shows the expected association between electoral system
proportionality, a small number of large districts, and multiple legislative parties, but also
demonstrates that these relationships are not deterministic.

Insert Table 1

Several factors may account for the imperfect association of district number and effective
number of legislative parties. For example, as scholars of the social origins of parties have long
argued, party systems reflect salient societal cleavages as much as they reflect ballot rules
(Neumann 1956, Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Kitschelt et al. 1999). A country with a highly
proportional electoral system and large districts may still have two major parties if only one
significant cleavage is present in its society. Neto and Cox (1997), for example, argue that, in
countries with proportional electoral systems, an increase in salient social cleavages will lead to
an increase in effective parties.8
Likewise, as Chhibber (1999) has pointed out in his analysis of India, even countries with
majoritarian electoral systems and small districts (relative to population size) can have highly
fragmented party systems when regional identities are politically salient. In such a case,
Duverger’s law may operate at the district level, but different parties may compete in each
district, leading to fragmentation at the national level. Finally, specific institutional features of
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countries, such as the number of seats in their legislatures, may influence district number and
party fragmentation independent of electoral system proportionality. In any case, the necessary
empirical variation exists to discuss party system fragmentation and electoral district size
separately, an approach which will allow us to appreciate their independent impacts on budgetary
politics. The insights thus gained may also be useful in helping to explain other public policies
such as trade. They can help move the literature beyond simple tests of electoral system type,
which may produce contradictory findings, and towards more nuanced examinations of party
system and electoral district characteristics.

Data and Methods

I test my argument with a very broad dataset that includes all democracies from 1975 to
the present. The analysis, somewhat restricted due to data availability, considers 853
observations – 66 countries for an average of 13 years each. Examining all democracies for
which data are available, and across a reasonably wide swath of time, is, I believe, an important
empirical contribution to the literature. Most studies of the political economy of deficit spending
have focused on the OECD countries, a group consisting primarily of rich democracies with
parliamentary institutions.9 It is true that I consider here only democracies, as my theory
requires an electoral element to be valid. Nevertheless, I examine representative governments of
all income levels, from the poorest African and Asian states to the richest European ones. I also
examine countries that use a wide variety of political institutions, including those with
proportional and majoritarian electoral systems and those with parliamentary and presidential
executive arrangements. This broad empirical examination provides a more extensive test of the
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generalizability of my theory than would a more geographically limited study. It also allows me
the opportunity to say something preliminary about the global relevance of other explanations
common in the literature.
For my dependent variable, I make use of each country’s total national budget surplus
divided by its gross domestic product (GDP) and multiplied by one hundred. A negative surplus
is of course a deficit. A variety of measures have been used in the budget literature, from
reported deficit values to per capita changes in net public debt. I adopt this measure because it is
a direct measure of each country’s budget balance, it is available for a large number of countryyears, and it comes from a reputable source – the International Monetary Fund (2006). Dividing
each country’s budget surplus by the size of its national economy is necessary because, for
example, a $1 million deficit means something different to a country with a $10 million economy
than to a country with a $10 billion economy.
I use the total number electoral districts in a country’s lower house (controlling for
national population) to measure my key independent variable – electorate district size. The more
electoral districts in a democracy, the smaller the population of each district is likely to be. I
calculate this variable by dividing the total number of legislators in a country’s lower house by
the country’s mean district magnitude.10 For one of my robustness tests, I also compute the
average population of each electoral district by dividing each country’s national population by its
district number and then taking the natural log. I expect electoral district number to be
negatively associated with budget surpluses and electoral district size to be positively associated.
To measure the role of government fragmentation in increasing the likelihood of deficit
spending, I include four dummy variables in the model.11 The variable “presidential divided” is
coded “1” in the presence of divided presidential government, and “0” otherwise.12 The variable
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“parliamentary majoritarian” is coded “1” in the presence of a majoritarian parliamentary
government, and “0” otherwise.13 The variable “parliamentary coalition” is coded “1” in the
presence of a coalition parliamentary government, and “0” otherwise.14 Lastly, the variable
“parliamentary minority” is coded “1” in the presence of a minority parliamentary government,
and “0” otherwise.15 All four of these variables are coded “0” in the presence of a unitary
presidential government, my omitted category.
Why do I include information about the form of a country’s government when
operationalizing party fragmentation? It is well understood that the effect of party fragmentation
in a country’s legislature depends sensitively on its legislative-executive arrangements. In
parliamentary systems, legislatures must choose and support the government, whereas in
presidential systems they have no such function. As a result, fragmented legislatures will only
produce diverse coalition governments in parliamentary systems. Further, as Huber (1996) has
shown, the need to maintain support for a government can have important repercussions for party
discipline in parliamentary systems. For these reasons, and many others, it is possible to
consider the impact of party fragmentation only in the context of form of government.
The literature leads us to expect that all four of the variables will be negatively associated
with budget surpluses, and that the variable “parliamentary coalition” will have the highest
coefficient. The omitted variable is “presidential unitary,” and, as I have already discussed, most
research indicates that such systems should be the least likely to engage in deficit spending.
Parliamentary systems with fragmented, coalition governments, on the other hand, should be the
most likely to engage in deficit spending. The other three systems should be somewhere in
between these two extremes.16
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I also estimate a model using only a three-way variable measuring electoral system and a
dummy variable coded “1” for parliamentary systems.17 In code the electoral system variable
“0” when a country uses a PR system, “1” when it uses a mixed system, and “2” when it uses a
majoritarian system. This analysis allows me to test whether a single measurement of electoral
system proportionality is preferable to my system of measuring district size and party
fragmentation separately. I expect the country-specific effects of electoral system to generate an
ambiguous, insignificant finding for the variable. By contrast, following Franzese (2002), I
expect the parliamentary system dummy to co-vary negatively with budget surpluses.
To operationalize government turnover in each of my country-years, I make use of the
political system’s “electoral volatility”.18 Electoral volatility is the average partisan turnover in
legislative seats from one election to the next (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). It is a good
measure of the probability of government change because it captures the average reliability of
voting support enjoyed by political parties in each system. When the parties that make up a
governing coalition do not enjoy stable voting support, they will expect their tenure in office to
be short, creating (perhaps) an incentive to pass deficits on to future leaders. I compute electoral
volatility by summing the absolute value of the differences in lower house seats won by each
party across the two elections and dividing by two. I then take the result and divide it by the
number of years between each set of elections, thereby ensuring ceteris paribus that electoral
volatility will be higher in systems with frequent elections. Finally, I enter this number as the
country’s electoral volatility for every year until the next election. If the literature is correct, this
variable should be negatively associated with budget surpluses.
I also include in the model several variables meant to capture some additional political
determinants of deficit spending identified by the literature. I operationalize party centralization
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as the power of party leaders to control access to the ballot in national legislative elections. This
measure is the “ballot” variable introduced by Carey and Shugart (1995) to explain better a
legislator’s “incentive to cultivate a personal vote.”19
My variable “party decentralization 1” is coded “1” when party leaders have nomination
power but voters can reorder the list, and “0” otherwise. Similarly, my variable “party
decentralization 2” is coded “1” when party leaders have almost no control over ballot access,
and “0” otherwise. Country-years coded “1” for “party decentralization 1” are therefore
characterized by moderately decentralized parties, whereas country-years coded “1” for “party
decentralization 2” are characterized by highly decentralized parties. Country-years where
parties were centralized received a “0” for both variables. I expect both variables to be
negatively associated with budget surpluses.
While Carey and Shugart (1995) developed a coding scheme for the variable that I use
here, they only coded it for a few illustrative countries. I have therefore compiled, to my
knowledge, the first broadly cross-national and cross-temporal dataset of this variable.20 This
coding constituted a very complex data task, as locating information on party nomination
procedures across all democracies, and especially across three decades for each democracy, is
difficult. I have made use of a wide variety of sources to complete the coding, and have
triangulated results wherever possible.21
To test for the importance of ideology on deficit outcome, I include a dummy variable
coded “1” in the presence of a leftist governing party.22 Volkerink and de Haan (2001) and
Oatley (1999) find some evidence that leftist governing parties are more likely to run budget
deficits than rightist governing parties, but Hahm, Kamlet, and Mowery (1996) find no
relationship.
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Likewise, to test for the presence of a political-business cycle in deficit spending, I make
use of a variable coded “1” if an election occurs in that year.23 If governments are spending
more to reduce unemployment and improve growth immediately prior to elections, we would
expect this variable to be negative and significant. Next, I include in the analysis a measure of
the ability of legislatures and other institutions to constrain the executive. This variable, coming
from Marshall and Jaggers (2000), takes a coding from “1”, indicating a highly independent
executive, to “7”, indicating a highly constrained executive. When executives are able to
exercise unconstrained power, they may be better able to overcome the collective action problem
and discipline spending.
To test for the regional spread of ideas and economic conditions, I estimate one of my
robustness tests with dummy variables for each of the regions of the world.24 Finally, to control
for development bank conditionality, I generate a dummy variable coded “1” when a country is a
net recipient of funds from either the World Bank or the IMF in a particular year.25 Each of my
political variables (except “election year”) is lagged one year vis-à-vis the dependent variable. I
summarize the characteristics of these variables and their expected relationships with budget
surplus in Table 2.

Insert Table 2

I also include in the analysis a series of economic variables. I control for a country’s
development status with its logged GDP per capita and for its potential welfare burden with the
percentage of its population over 64 years old. Further, I use a variable measuring each
country’s annual percentage change in GDP to control for economic shocks. I also include the
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total value of a country’s trade divided by its GDP to control for a country’s sensitivity to world
markets, and logged annual percentage changes in each country’s exchange rate with the United
States dollar to measure changes in the value of traded goods. Further, I make use of the logged
national population for each observation to control for country size when electoral district
number is also included in the model.26
Finally, to wash-out the potentially important effect of world energy prices, I include in
the models the interaction of the value of domestic energy production and world oil prices (as a
proxy for the overall value of energy resources).27 Countries with high domestic energy
production should be more likely to have surplus budgets when energy prices are elevated, and I
therefore expect the interactive variable to be positively associated with budget surplus. On the
other hand, when domestic energy production is low and world oil prices are high (represented
by the “price of oil” variable), I expect budget deficits to be greater. Finally, when the world
price of oil is low and domestic energy production high (represented by the “energy production”
variable), budgets should either be in deficit or there should be no discernable impact. I provide
information about the economic control variables in Table 3.

Insert Table 3

To ensure the validity of my primary model, I estimate it with three different statistical
techniques – random effects regression, fixed effects regression, and maximum likelihood
estimation (MLE). Further, to evaluate the robustness of these results, I use random effects
regression to estimate an additional three models with alternate specifications of certain key
variables. One of these models, the third, tests for the impact of electoral system proportionality
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independent of electoral district size, party fragmentation, and government turnover. When
estimating each of my models, I include a lagged dependent variable on the right side of the
equation to correct for any first-order autocorrelation that may be present.
There are advantages and disadvantages to using each of the three statistical techniques
that I adopt. Given the nature of my data, I believe that the most appropriate technique is
random effects regression, and I therefore use it both for my primary model and for each of my
robustness tests. Unlike a simple OLS estimator with panel corrected standard errors, this
approach recognizes that there may be effects on the dependent variable specific to each crosssection.28 On the downside, however, it makes the dubious assumption that these effects are
distributed randomly.
In practice, estimating specific country effects, as in fixed effects regression, is generally
preferable to making the assumption of random distribution. However, much of the interesting
variation in my data is cross-national, and fixed effects regression has the major drawback of
emphasizing cross-temporal variation when computing the coefficients. As a result, while fixed
effects regression minimizes the bias caused by omitted variables, it also washes out some
potentially interesting variation from my model. Finally, making use of maximum likelihood
estimation, a completely different technique, has the benefit of reducing errors that may result
from any non-linearity in my hypothesized relationships. If my results are unchanged when each
of these statistical techniques is used, and if they are robust to the battery of alternate
operationalizations to which I subject them, it is highly likely that they reveal a genuine
relationship.
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Results

I present the results of my primary empirical models in Table 4. The analyses provide
strong support for the role of electoral district number and size in encouraging deficit spending.
They also provide evidence that another factor related to electoral system proportionality – party
fragmentation – can have the opposite impact on fiscal behavior. They do not, however, support
the role of government turnover in generating budget deficits. These results are strikingly robust
regardless of the statistical technique used to estimate them.

Insert Table 4

District number, controlling for each country’s population size, is in the expected
direction and strongly significant in each of the three models. The coefficient of the random
effects model indicates that an increase of one electoral district produces on average a .003%
decrease in budget surplus (or increase in budget deficit) as a percent of GDP. The impact of
district number on budgetary politics is therefore important; on average, an increase of one
standard deviation in a country’s electoral district number will lead to a 0.48% increase in deficit
spending/GDP. This effect is estimated to be an incredible twelve times greater by the fixed
effects model. If we take the fixed effects results, therefore, an increase in district number of one
standard deviation leads to an average reduction of 5.7% in surplus spending as a percent of
GDP. Given the range of the dependent variable, this is a very strong effect. The statistical
model therefore provides robust support for my argument.
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Turning to the four dummy variables measuring party fragmentation and form of
government, the results provide some support for the arguments found in the literature. The
“parliamentary coalition” variable is significant in the expected direction for two of the three
models, and it also has the largest coefficient among the dummies. The insignificance of
“parliamentary coalition” in the fixed effects model and the similarity of its coefficient with that
of “parliamentary majoritarian” should give us some pause when drawing a firm association
between party fragmentation and budget deficits. Nevertheless, I believe that the evidence
broadly supports the common contention that fragmented governing coalitions will tend to
produce more deficit spending than other forms of democratic government.
In two of the three models, the “parliamentary minority” and “parliamentary coalition”
variables are significant in the expected direction, indicating that these systems are more likely to
generate deficits than unified presidential governments, the omitted variable. The dummy for
presidential divided government is not significant, perhaps because of the rarity of such systems
in my dataset; its predicted effect is, however, in the expected direction. These findings support
Franzese (2002) in pointing to a clear relationship between parliamentary systems and deficit
spending.
Interesting, my models provide no support for another contention commonly found in the
literature, that government turnover produces higher budget deficits. The phenomenon of
government turnover, closely related to electoral system proportionality, is measured indirectly
here with electoral volatility. That variable remains steadfastly insignificant in each of my three
primary models, but more research will need to be done before we can conclude that there is no
effect.

23

What do the models reveal about some of the other political variables highlighted in the
public finance literature? The “party decentralization 1” dummy, measuring moderate
decentralization and the “incentive to cultivate a personal vote” (Carey and Shugart 1995) is
significant and in the expected direction in two of the three models. The “party decentralization
2” variable, on the other hand, lacks significance in the random effects and MLE models, and is
dropped from the fixed effects model due to its time invariance. These results, taken together,
provide moderate support for the relationship between party decentralization and budget deficits.
Strangely, the executive constraint variable is positively associated with budget surpluses
in each of the three models, a relationship that is significant at the 1% level. It may be that this
variable is picking up the effects of democratic consolidation, as it is generally coded “7”, the
maximum level of constraint, for all types of established democracies. I find no support for the
impact of governing party ideology on the tendency to run-up deficits. These results are in
keeping with the findings of other studies questioning the impact of leftist ideology (Hahm,
Kamlet, and Mowery 1996) on fiscal profligacy. While a governing party’s belief system is no
doubt important when explaining the type and even the level of public spending, it does not seem
to impact deficits.
As expected, the dummy “election year” is significant and negatively associated with
budget surpluses; this relationship is present across all three of the models. It supports the
existence of a political-business cycle, with governments ramping-up public spending just before
elections to build political support. The results also indicate that participation in an IMF or
World Bank program promotes fiscal restraint, with the “World Bank/IMF” dummy strongly
significant in each of the models.
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The results for the economic control variables also reveal some interesting information.
The price of oil interacted with domestic energy production is significant and positively
associated with budget surplus, as expected. Of the two components of that variable, only “price
of oil” is separately significant and only in one of the three estimations. The variable
“trade/GDP” is statistically significant and positively associated with budget surpluses in two of
the models, a finding that is consistent with the literature (Persson and Tabellini 2003). My
measure of GDP per capita is significant at the 1% level in all three models, but co-varies
positively with surpluses in the random effects and MLE models and negatively with surpluses in
the fixed effects model. The results for the first two models indicate that richer states are more
likely to run budget surpluses, an intuitive finding. The results for the fixed effects model are
more surprising, but no doubt reflect its emphasis on cross-temporal variation; they indicate that,
within the same country, an increase in national income leads to an increase in deficit spending.
Perhaps this result reflects a temptation to overspend in economic good times.
The variable measuring change in exchange rate is negative and highly significant across
all of the models. This result indicates an association between currency depreciation and budget
deficits, perhaps due to the rising cost of foreign goods. Economic crises, as measured by
change in GDP, have no discernable impact on budget deficits, but logged population, inserted to
clarify the impact of electoral district number, is significant and positively related to surplus
spending in two of the models. Finally, the percentage of a country’s population over 64 years
old is significantly related to deficit spending in each of the models, indicating that governments
with aging populations suffer from greater fiscal stress.

Insert Table 5
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What do the additional robustness tests reveal about the relationship between electoral
district size and deficit spending? The first model substitutes “electoral district population” for
“electoral district number” and the population control. The results are essentially the same as for
the primary models, with “electoral district population” significant and co-varying positively
with deficit spending. Likewise, the results for the dummy variables measuring party
fragmentation and form of government, as well as the results for all of the control variables,
support the same conclusions drawn from the primary models. The second robustness test
replicates the primary model with the addition of a series of regional dummy variables. This
addition has no discernable impact on the results.
The final robustness test is perhaps the most interesting. It substitutes the variables
related to electoral system proportionality – electoral district number, electoral volatility, and the
four party fragmentation dummies – with simple measures of electoral proportionality and form
of government. I describe these new measures, “electoral system” and “parliamentary system”,
in the previous section. As expected, the variable “electoral system” is insignificant, providing
evidence for my proposition that the independent, and sometimes contradictory, implications of
proportionality should be measured separately. The insignificance of the variable does not
indicate irrelevance; rather, it provides evidence that the mixed and contradictory effects of
electoral system are, in effect, cancelling each other out. Interestingly, the “parliamentary
system” dummy is significant in the expected direction, supporting the notion that presidential
systems are less inclined toward deficit spending.
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Conclusions

The insights generated by prior studies on the political economy of deficit spending are
impressive but incomplete. In this paper, I contribute in two important ways to our
understanding of the political causes of budget deficits. First, I present a new theory linking
electoral district size with fiscal outcomes and argue that the impact of electoral system
proportionality on deficit spending is multidimensional. Second, I test my theory (and,
preliminarily, other theories) with a much broader empirical model than those generally used to
examine arguments in public finance. The quantitative analysis strongly supports the argument
that countries with a few large electoral districts will be less inclined to overspend than countries
with many small districts. The results also support the association of party fragmentation,
parliamentary systems, election year cycles, and party decentralization with deficit spending, and
the role of development bank programs in supporting balanced budgets. Preliminarily, they
provide no support for the role of legislative and government turnover in fiscal profligacy, but
more expansive and direct tests will be needed to confirm this finding.
Moreover, the research also indicates that two institutional features related to electoral
proportionality – party fragmentation and large district size – can have contradictory impacts on
budgetary outcomes. This finding helps bring to light the complex impact of electoral
proportionality on deficit spending, a theoretical development that has the potential to greatly
improve our understanding of policy formation in a variety of areas. On the empirical side, the
project helps pull developing countries and diverse democratic institutions into a literature that
has centered on explaining the behavior of wealthy, parliamentary systems. As our knowledge
of the determinants of fiscal profligacy expands, we will be in a better position to advise
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governments and development banks in the creation of budgetary institutions. We will also
understand better the exercise of one of the most important responsibilities of government –
deciding how to spend public resources. It is hoped that this paper can help take the literature
another step in that direction.
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1

Electoral proportionality is the extent to which the legislative seat share of parties reflects their

percentage vote share in the electorate. See Powell 2000 and Lijphart 1999.
2

In the trade literature, for example, compare the findings of Rogowski 1987 and Mansfield and

Busch 1995. In the budget literature, compare the statistical findings of Persson and Tabellini
2003 in their cross-sectional and cross-sectional, time-series models.
3

To my knowledge, the only broader quantitative examination of the role of political institutions

on budget deficits is Persson and Tabellini 2003. Mukherjee 2003 and Persson, Roland, and
Tabellini 2000 examine a wide variety of countries, but they use their data to explain government
spending.
4

For more on common pooled resource problems and collective action problems, see Olson

1971 and Ostrom 1990.
5

Hahm, Kamlet, and Mowery 1996 dispute this finding.

6

This concept was developed and measured by Carey and Shugart 1995.

7

Their cross-sectional, time-series analysis indicates that exogenous shocks may actually

increase budget deficits more in majoritarian than in PR systems, or at least that the impact is
ambiguous.
8

See the discussion of this point in Hallerberg 2004.

9

An important exception is Persson and Tabellini 2003.

10

The data for total legislative seats are from Henisz 2003, and the data for mean district

magnitude are from Beck et al. 2001 and Wallack et al. 2003. I merge these last two datasets
where possible to achieve the largest number of available N’s.
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11

Due to data availability, I am not able to test arguments about fiscal process fragmentation in

this model.
12

For my purposes, a divided presidential government is one where the executive is popularly

elected and where the president’s party does not enjoy a majority in the lower legislative house.
13

For my purposes, a majoritarian parliamentary government is one where the government is

selected by the legislature and a single party controls more than 50% of seats in the lower house.
14

For my purposes, a coalition parliamentary government is one where the government is

selected by the legislature, no single party controls 50% of lower house seats, but the
government coalition enjoys a parliamentary majority.
15

For my purposes, a minority parliamentary government is one where the government is

selected by the legislature and the government coalition does not enjoy a parliamentary majority.
All of these four variables are computed using data from Beck et al. 2001.
16

Edin and Ohlsson 1991 also find evidence that parliamentary systems with minority

governments should have a strong proclivity towards deficit spending, but parliamentary
coalition systems have received much more attention in the literature.
17

The data come from Beck et al. 2001.

18

I compute this variable myself using data from Henisz 2003, Beck et al. 2001, and Inter-

Parliamentary Union 1973-2000.
19

Carey and Shugart 1995 propose three variables to measure a legislator’s “incentive to

cultivate a personal vote.” Hallerberg and Marier 2004 make use of all three of these variables to
explain budget deficits in Latin America. I only consider party ballot control here because, due
to data availability, it was impractical to code all three of the variables for wider swath cases that
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I consider. Further, unlike Hallerberg and Marier 2004, I do not interact the variable with
executive constraint.
20

Hallerberg and Marier 2004 and Nielson 2003 have coded the “ballot” variable for a limited

number of country-years. Wallack and her colleagues (2003) have compiled it for a broader
number of cases, but they used a significantly different coding scheme from the one proposed by
Carey and Shugart 1995.
21

John Carey, Kenneth Janda, and Robert Harmel provided advice on the coding. Among the

data sources used to code this variable are Carey and Shugart 1995, Hallerberg and Marier 2004,
Janda 1980, Delury 1987, Ware 1996, Inter-Parliamentary Union (1973-2000), and the web sites
of national election authorities, IDEA, and the National Democratic Institute.
22

This variable is taken from Beck et al. 2001.

23

This variable is taken from Beck et al. 2001 and Henisz 2003.

24

I use Polity country codes for the regional classification scheme.

25

The data for this variable come from World Bank 2005.
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Data for all of these variables are taken from World Bank 2005.

27

World oil prices are from British Petroleum 2003 and are converted to 1996 dollars. Domestic

energy production is from World Bank 2005 and is a measure of the value of primary energy
production in kilotons of oil equivalent.
28

In any case, I do not have balanced panels, a precondition for normal regression with panel

corrected standard errors. See Beck and Katz 1995.
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Table 1: Three Partially Related Variables
Electoral System

Electoral System
(0=PR, 1=Mixed,
2=Majoritarian)

Effective Number of
Parties

Electoral District
Number

1.00

Effective Number of
Parties

-.366

1.00

Electoral District
Number

.535

-.249

1.00

The variable Effective Number of Parties was developed by Laakso and Taagepera 1979. It is computed
using data from Beck et al. using a formula from Lijphart 1999. See the “Data and Methods” section for
information about the other variables. The numbers displayed are correlation coefficients. N=837.
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Table 2: The Key Variables
Variable

How Computed

-121 to
9.23
1 to 659

-2.78

Expectations
(Y=Budget
Surplus/GDP)
N/A

97.1

Negative

Average seat turnover by party between
legislative elections

0 to .890

0.75

Negative

Presidential
Divided

“1” = Divided presidential government

Dummy
Variable

.120

Negative

Parliamentary
Majoritarian

“1” = Majoritarian parliamentary government

Dummy
Variable

.225

Negative

Parliamentary
Coalition

“1” = Coalition parliamentary government

Dummy
Variable

.297

Parliamentary
Minority

“1” = Minority parliamentary government

Dummy
Variable

.143

Negative and with the
highest coefficient of
the four system
dummies
Negative

Party
Decentralization 1

“1” = party nomination with voter control
over ordering
“0” = total party ballot control OR free
candidate access to ballot

Dummy
Variable

.237

Negative

Party
Decentralization 2

“1” = free candidate access to ballot
“0” = total party ballot control OR party
nomination with voter control over ordering

Dummy
Variable

.190

Negative

Executive
Constraint

Degree of constraint on the executive

0 to 6

5.63

Negative

Leftist
Government

“1” = Leftist government

Dummy

.324

Negative (?)

Election Year

“1” = Election Year

Dummy

.278

Negative

World Bank / IMF

“1” = Net receipt of funds from the IMF or
World Bank
Natural log of the average population within
each lower house electoral district

Dummy

.309

Positive

9.70 to
16.6

12.8

Positive

Electoral System

“0” = PR
“1”= Mixed
“2” = Plurality

0, 1, or 2

.639

Ambiguous

Parliamentary
System

“1” = Parliamentary System

Dummy

.665

Negative

Surplus/GDP

(Total National Budget Surplus / GDP) X 100

Electoral District
Number

Number of electoral districts for the lower
house

Electoral
Volatility

Electoral District
Population

Range

Mean
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Table 3: Economic Control Variables
Variable
Price of Oil X
Energy Production

Price of Oil X Energy Production

.000129 to
.997

.0816

Expectations
(Y=Budget
Surplus/GDP)
Positive

Price of Oil

Price of oil per barrel in constant US dollars

30.5

Negative

Energy Production

Domestic production of primary energy in
kilotons of oil equivalent
(Total value of trade / GDP) X 100

12.6 to
68.3
.00000696
to .0488
12.3 to
226
-.347 to
4.94
5.38 to
10.8
-.119 to
.128
2.33 to
17.9
12.3 to
20.7

.00269

Negative (?)

64.8

Positive

.144

Negative

8.97

Positive

.0289

Positive

10.1

Negative

16.3

Unknown

Trade/GDP
∆ Exchange Rate

How Computed

lnGDPpc

Natural log of the annual change in XR with
the US Dollar
Natural log of GDP per capita

∆ GDP

Annual percentage change in GDP

Pop Over 64

Percentage of the population older than 64

lnPop

Natural log of the population

Range

Mean
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Table 4: Results of the Primary Empirical Models
Dependent Variable = Budget Surplus/GDP
N=853
Variable
Electoral District Number

Random Effects

-.003**
(.001)
Electoral Volatility
.819
(1.93)
Presidential Divided
-.127
(.646)
Parliamentary Majoritarian
-1.33**
(.629)
Parliamentary Coalition
-1.38**
(.654)
Parliamentary Minority
-.891
(.724)
Party
-.603
Decentralization 1
(.493)
Party
-.0511
Decentralization 2
(.507)
Executive Constraint
.743***
(.252)
Leftist Government
-.232
(.387)
Election Year
-.921**
(.381)
World Bank / IMF
3.98***
(.648)
Price of Oil X Energy
5.52*
Production
(2.89)
Price of Oil
-.016
(.014)
Energy Production
-106
(83.3)
Trade/GDP
.007
(.007)
∆ Exchange Rate
-4.04***
(.461)
lnGDPpc
2.32***
(.335)
∆ GDP
5.88
(5.74)
Pop Over 64
-.288***
(.080)
lnPop
.315*
(.170)
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 All tests are 2-tailed.
All analyses include a lagged dependent variable.
Standard errors are in parenthesis.

MLE

Fixed Effects

-.006**
(.003)
-.231
(1.95)
-.416
(.696)
-2.08**
(.935)
-2.14**
(.966)
-1.77*
(1.02)
-1.71*
(.921)
.201
(1.09)
1.58***
(.321)
-.043
(.428)
-.722**
(.351)
3.74***
(.708)
5.09*
(2.98)
.000
(.014)
-73.0
(.820)
.041***
(.014)
-5.78***
(.563)
2.41***
(.504)
-.357
(5.76)
-.405***
(.139)
1.02***
(.356)

-.036**
(.017)
-2.58
(2.03)
-.469
(.740)
-3.08**
(1.53)
-2.34
(1.52)
-2.58*
(1.54)
-8.60***
(1.64)
Dropped
2.15***
(.343)
.500
(.461)
-.614*
(.344)
3.10***
(.753)
8.12**
(3.36)
-.031*
(.018)
26.6
(84.7)
.112***
(.021)
-7.46***
(.552)
-6.27***
(2.14)
-5.56
(5.81)
-.635**
(.297)
3.85
(3.00)
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Table 5: Results of the Robustness Tests
Dependent Variable = Budget Surplus/GDP
N=853
Variable

Model 1

Electoral District Number
Electoral District Population
Electoral Volatility
Presidential Divided
Parliamentary Majoritarian
Parliamentary Coalition
Parliamentary Minority
Party
Decentralization 1
Party
Decentralization 2
Executive Constraint
Leftist Government
Election Year

.231*
(.139)
.785
(1.93)
-.115
(.640)
-1.32**
(.626)
-1.42**
(.657)
-.863
(.722)
-.476
(.494)
.030
(.507)
.738***
(.252)
-.273
(.390)
-.932**
(.381)

Model 2
(With Regional
Dummies)
-.003**
(.001)
.109
(1.95)
-.046
(.656)
-2.00***
(.702)
-2.23***
(.754)
-1.51*
(.826)
-.807
(.514)
-.106
(.552)
.781***
(.264)
-.187
(.405)
-.903**
(.379)

Electoral System
Parliamentary System
World Bank / IMF
Price of Oil X Energy
Production
Price of Oil
Energy Production
Trade/GDP
∆ Exchange Rate
lnGDPpc
∆ GDP
Pop Over 64
lnPop

4.05***
(.644)
5.46*
(2.89)
-.017
(.014)
-106
(83.4)
.004
(.006)
-4.01***
(.461)
2.32***
(.328)
5.44
(5.73)
-.288***
(.079)

4.59***
(.677)
6.42**
(2.92)
-.018
(.014)
-104
(82.9)
.003
(.008)
-4.18***
(.467)
2.46***
(.376)
5.44
(5.83)
-.461***
(.128)
.385*
(.213)

Model 3

.163
(.466)
.261
(.519)
.127
(.266)
-.002
(.396)
-.868**
(.392)
-.157
(.263)
-.901*
(.513)
2.84***
(.626)
5.65*
(2.95)
-.025*
(.014)
-105
(78.7)
.008
(.007)
-3.18***
(.458)
1.63***
(.308)
5.81
(5.37)
-.197**
(.078)
.139
(.149)

***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 All tests are 2-tailed.
All analyses are random effects models with a lagged dependent variable.
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
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